-3-| protective system is assumed not to be effective, some form of dispersive fuel motion (reactor dis-I | assembly) is required to provide sufficient negative reactivity to terminate a given accident sequence. ;
The whole-core accidents usually considered in evaluating the safety of UlFBRs can be classified 1 in tvo broad categories: (1) transient undercooling (usually loss-of-flow) without scram accidents, ! and (2) reactivity-insertion (or transient overpower) without scram accidents. These accidents can be . further subdivided into an initiating phase and a core-disruptive phase. The accident can either | terminate at the end of the initiating piiase with a largely intact core, or proceed into complete core disruption either by gradual melting of the whole core or by a severe prompt-critical excursion which directly disassembles the core. An unprotected loss-of-cooling accident can itself lead potentially to ! ; the addition of significant amounts of reactivity. However, during the initial stages, important | differences exist between loss-of-cooling and reactivity-insertion accidents. One basic difference j ' lies in the temporal sequence in which the temperatures of the fuel and cladding rise. In the case of a reactivity-insertion accident, it is the fuel temperature that rises first. ! ; 3.1 Transient Overpower Accidents ; Inasmuch as coolant temperatures rise relatively slowly in a transient overpower accident, considerable f..el melting can occur before sodium voiding and, at some point, fuel-pin failures (cladding ruptures in the core region) can occur. The reactor protection system should be designed to prevent tuel failures for anticipated transients, ^fter fuel-pin failure, : ipid sodium expulsion from the coolant channels potentially can be induced because of the ejection of molten fuel and fi.-sion-'• product gas (for irradiated fuel) from the fuel pins. Particularly in large IMFBRs, sodium voiding can lead to rapid reactivity insertions. However, the expulsion of fuel from the reactor corf region through sweepout by sodium vapor and liquid, or through expansion of the fission gas-fuel mixture, can counteract with negative reactivities and tend to terminate t..e excursion. If this is not tffective, j the sodium void reactivity, in combination with the initiating reactivity, possibly can lead to a f prompt-critical excursion with a resultant core disassembly due to high fuel vapor pressures. The ' interplay between the positive and negative reactivity effects is complex and depends on the fuel-pin i failure times, locations, and modes, and on the magnitudes of the fuel and sodium reactivity worths.
i The key problems in the initiating phase of transient overpower accidents that require inpile testing a/e:
(1) An understanding of transient fuel performance and fuel failure thresholds to determine operating design margin.
(2) The nature and location of fuel pin failures. (3) The rate and direction of fuel and coolant movements following fuel pin failure.
• (4) The characteristics of extended motion of fuel, including any freezing or plugging and ultimate coolability of the core, if the initiating phase of the accident does not lead directly to a • mechanical disassembly.
3.2 Loss-of-Flow Accidents j Whole-core loss-of-flow accidents potentially can be initiated in several ways. However, the initiating event usually considered is that of loss of off-site power with a resultant coastdown of a]', pumps and with an assumed failure of the. protection system. In such a flow coastdown without scram accident, the first substantial temperature increase occurs in the coolant and the cladding. If no protective action is taken, this leads to sodium boiling near the top of the core. After sodium boiling and ejection from an assembly, a thin liquid film remains on the fuel pin, but the film dries quickly. Following this sodium-film dryout, essentially no heat transfer occurs from che fuel. The : fuel temperature increases rapidly while simultaneously the temperature distribution within each pin t tends to become flat. In the meantime, the cladding melts and can be r illowed by fuel melting and J slumping, which may add significant amounts of reactivity and lead tc a prompt-critical excursion, or . by fuel dispersal which will rapidly reduce power. A common point to all fast reactor whole-core accident scenarios in which loss of active shutdown devices is assumed is that irreversible dispersive fuel motion must occur in order to provide permanent neutronic shutdown. Thus, without regard to initiating events, three generalized accident scenarios involving somewhat different fuel dispersion processes can be identified, although these nay overlap.
(1) Situation.-: in which small amounts of fuel can be removed permanently through hydraulic forces or mild internal pressurization from fission products, cladding vapor, and/or fuel vapor.
-5-Subassembly geometries could be retained and in-place cooling maintained or established under low fission power or decay heat conditions.
(2) Situations similar to (1) above, but in which either permanent fuel removal or in-place cooling are not maintained or established early in the accident sequence and vhi«.U proceed to the "transition" phase involving a gradual loss of subassembly geometry. Fuel removal and neutronic shutdown would occur either through a series of mild pressurization events or through gradual melt-out and : boil-out processes. ! (3) Situations in which gross fuel removal occurs due to a general "mechanical" disassembly. > Tn this case, sufficient internal pressurization is implied such that the core Is well dispersed. The damage consequences from this type of event can vary significantly depending on whether the pressuri-! zation that causes the disassembly is by fuel vapor pressure or gaseous fission products. ! During and following the events leading to termination of the accident, the thermal energy generated and stored in core materials can be converted to work energy. Work can come from either the expansion of the core materials or the interaction of these materials with the sodium coolant. Once the energy partition is established, the response of the system can be determined. After the work energy *s released and imparted to the system structure and containment, the whole-core disruptive accident enters its final phase involving long-term decay heat removal from the fuel. The final disposition of core materials and the measures requireJ to assure cooling of the core debris are, of course, dependent on the reactor size and design.
The key problems in the transition phase of a core-disruptive whole-core accident which require in-pile tests are:
(1) The l.ature of extended motion of core materials following a nonenergetic meltdown. It is currently believed these are dispersive and would essentially preclude severe secondary criticalities.
(2) In cases where an accident proceeds to disassembly with sodium in the core, the rate of transfer of heat from the fuel to sodium must be established.
(3) Whether fission gases can exert pressures to disassemble the core at low fuel temperatures must be established.
(4) The ultimate coolability and containment of core debris.
A. Requirements for New In-Pile Testing Facilities
The ideal safety testing reactor woulA incorporate features ti.at would permit complete prototypical simv 1 ation of the LMFBR environment for a wide variety of accident conditions. It has been concluded, after extensive study, that the ideal testing system that can "do everything" is neither practical nor required. The experiment needs can be met in realistic and achievable test systems that provide prototypicality of only those test parameters that are required to meet bpecified experiment objectives. The following specific test reactor requirements were established as a oasis for evaluating and selecting practical test reactor systems.
(1) The system should be able to -est at least one ful? fuel assembly and preferably more than one.
(2) The system must be able to produce shaped power transients of the type shown in Fig. 1 .
(3) The test fuel assembly must have a very small power depression across it, which implies a hard spectrum in the test region (but not necessarily elsewhere).
(4) The system should have inherent neutronic shutdown which can automatically compensate for unanticipated reactivity changes in the test fuel assembly.
(5) A short period is cisirable for some tests (initial periods of 1-3 msec).
(6) The system should have instrrmentation such as a neutron hodosocpe to measure fuel notion. (7) The system must be able to achieve the required energy depositions in tUo test fuel assembly without damage to itself. It would be desirable also 11 have a short period available for fuel-coolant interaction and effective equation-of-state tests.
Choice of Facility Type
New facility testing capabilities will be required to accommodate experiments in most of the areas of concern. This new capability would include testing fuel arrays up to full "jbasseably si2e (and possibly larger) with flat power distributions, and rated power test fuel operation for at least 30 sec or, alternatively, decay power levels for longer periods. In consideration of these experiment needs beyond the range of existing facility capabilities, a comprehensive screening and eva.jation of test reactor concepts was performed to identify the generic types of reactors, and specific concepts within each type, that can best serve the testing program.
Three generic types of reactors were studied. The first (designated Class I) was defined as a system capable of generating r'laped power transients without the need for significant reactor heat removal during the test. An additional requirement that can be imposed on the test reactor is some limited form of heat removal during a test which would permit longer term operation, particularly at lower power levels, in addition to shaped power transients. This type of facility was designated Class II. A further extension of the previous types to provide long-term steady-state operation (for days or weeks) in addition to Class I and Class II capabilities was designated as a Class III facility.
Based on these studies a mixed-spectrum Class. I safety research experiment facility with the flexibility of changing core loadings to accommodate different types of experiments was chosen to pursue through conceptual design.
Conceptual Design of a New Safety Research Experiment Facility

General
The reactor concept chosen has a central test hole surrounded by a neutron spectrum hardening zone of UO^-Cr fuel. A second converter zone composed of UC'ZrC-C (graphite) fuel surrounds the inner converter zone. An outer driver zone is composed of UCb-BeO fuel. Helium is circulated through the reactor in closed loops in order to maintain fuel containers cool during test operation and to remove reactor energy after the test. The reactor and primary coolant system (three loops required plus one standby) are embedded in a prestressed concrete reactor vessel of the type and general geometry used in HTGRs. . . ..
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Each loop la;s a gas circulator and heat exchanger whose capacity is bOZ of that required to cool the fuel containers after a peak power transient. In summary, the three zone Class 1 safety research experiment facility of the type described appears to be abJe to tied Lhe ex]>t» iiuent needs that can nuv be furesei-n. It '>as the ability to provide the required energy depositions, the test assembly power distributions, and inherent neutronic shutdown which will automatically compensate for unanticipated reactivity changes. It is designed to be easily ace-.sib]e and flexible to accommodate a vide range of experiment types. TRANSIENT OVERPOWER TEST TIME
